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The World Health Organization’s recommended pan-
demic influenza interventions, based on limited data, vary
by transmission pattern, pandemic phase, and illness
severity and extent. In the pandemic alert period, recom-
mendations include isolation of patients and quarantine of
contacts, accompanied by antiviral therapy. During the pan-
demic period, the focus shifts to delaying spread and
reducing effects through population-based measures. Ill
persons should remain home when they first became
symptomatic, but forced isolation and quarantine are inef-
fective and impractical. If the pandemic is severe, social
distancing measures such as school closures should be
considered. Nonessential domestic travel to affected areas
should be deferred. Hand and respiratory hygiene should
be routine; mask use should be based on setting and risk,
and contaminated household surfaces should be disinfec-
ted. Additional research and field assessments during pan-
demics are essential to update recommendations. Legal
authority and procedures for implementing interventions
should be understood in advance and should respect cul-
tural differences and human rights.
T
his article is the second of a 2-part series that summa-
rizes the scientific basis for nonpharmaceutical public
health interventions recommended by the World Health
Organization (WHO) to contain or reduce transmission of
pandemic influenza caused by a novel human influenza
subtype; it is designed to be read in conjunction with the
recommendations (1), which are intended as guidance and
not formal WHO advice (Appendix 1, available online at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/05-1371_
app1.htm) (2). The evidence base for recommendations is
limited, consisting primarily of historical and contemporary
observations, rather than controlled scientific studies. The
first part of this series summarized the transmission charac-
teristics of influenza viruses and the basis for interventions
to reduce international spread (3). This second part address-
es measures at the national and community levels that are
intended to reduce exposure of susceptible persons to the
novel virus. The observations that pandemics do not infect
all susceptible persons in the first wave and that subsequent
waves occur suggest that preventing disease by reducing
exposure is an achievable objective (3). By limiting expo-
sure, people who are not infected during the first wave may
have an increased chance of receiving virus-specific vac-
cine as it becomes available. In addition, if the virus
becomes less virulent over time, persons who fall ill in sub-
sequent waves may have milder illnesses. This article does
not address public communication or infection-control
measures for patient care (4,5).
Measures To Reduce Spread within Populations
Isolation of Patients and Quarantine of Contacts
Community Level
Reports from many countries indicate that mandatory
case reporting and isolating patients during the influenza
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impractical. In Canada, the medical officer of health for
the province of Alberta concluded that forced home isola-
tion of patients, posting signs on houses, and “quarantine”
(details unspecified) captured only ≈60% of patients in the
community because of diagnostic difficulties involving
mild cases and failure to notify cases to authorities. As the
medical officer noted, “many citizens regarded the placard
[sign outside the quarantined person’s house] as an injus-
tice, either because they did not believe the diagnosis jus-
tified, or because their neighbors were alleged by them to
be avoiding quarantine by concealment or evasion…
Charges of discrimination were frequently made against
the health department” (6).
In the Australian state of New South Wales, compulso-
ry reporting was deemed helpful to identify the first intro-
duction of cases into a community. However, once the
number of cases grew, reporting cases was not useful or
feasible. Also, mild cases were not reported. Compulsory
home isolation (which automatically followed reporting)
prevented neighbors from bringing needed assistance and
was replaced by requesting patients to remain at home (7).
The reports do not assess the potential impact that requests
for ill persons to remain at home voluntarily could have on
the reduction of disease within the community.
Closed Settings
In closed settings (e.g., military barracks and college
dormitories), early identification and isolation of patients
in 1918 usually did not completely stop virus transmission
but appeared to decrease attack rates, especially when sup-
plemented by restrictions on travel to and from the sur-
rounding community (8). In 1 report, 2 sections (A and B)
of the student army training corps at the University of
Chicago were housed in similar dormitories and fraternity
houses, but they had separate classrooms and eating places
and no formal contact with each other. In section A, the
men received frequent instructions to report illness; all ill
persons with “simple colds” or suspected influenza were
immediately isolated in hospitals or sent home. In section
B, “more or less close contact between sick and well mem-
bers” was maintained for several days. Lectures and class-
es were held as usual. From October 17 to November 8,
1918, a total of 26 of 685 men in section A had influenza
(attack rate 39/1,000), which was one tenth the attack rate
for section B (398/1,000, 93/234 men). New cases ceased
in section B after daily inspection and patient isolation
were implemented, but these measures were taken late in
the epidemic. Among 82 other students living at home or
in boarding houses, 7 became ill with influenza (9).
Similarly, an Australian Quarantine Service review of ship
epidemics in 1918 and 1919, including ships quarantined
at ports of entry, indicates that daily temperature checks
and immediate isolation of patients did not completely pre-
vent transmission but may have reduced the number of
cases (3).
Reports from several countries (e.g., Australia, Canada,
British-occupied Togo) refer to “isolation of contacts” (the
preferred modern terminology is isolation of patients and
quarantine of contacts) in 1918 and 1919. Details are
unclear, but these reports imply that contacts were con-
fined at home. Such measures were consistently described
as ineffective and impractical (6,7,10)
Some of the lessons learned from the 2003 severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic can be applied to
influenza, including the success of public campaigns to
encourage self-recognition of illness, telephone hotlines
providing medical advice, and early isolation when poten-
tial patients seek health care. Thermally scanning intercity
travelers was inefficient in detecting cases. Early isolation
of patients and quarantine of contacts successfully inter-
rupted SARS transmission, but influenza’s shorter serial
interval and earlier peak infectivity, plus the presence of
mild cases and possibility of transmission without symp-
toms, suggest that these measures would be considerably
less successful than they were for SARS (3,11,12).
Social Distancing Measures
Avoiding Crowding
A WHO consultation in 1959 concluded that the 1957
influenza pandemic tended to appear first in army units,
schools, and other groups where contact was close. Also
noting the reduced incidence in rural areas, the consulta-
tion suggested that avoiding crowding could reduce the
peak incidence of an epidemic and spread it over many,
rather than a few, weeks (13).
Closing Schools and Childcare Centers
A1959 WHO consultation concluded, “In the Northern
hemisphere at least, the opening of schools after the sum-
mer holidays seems to have played an important role in ini-
tiating the main epidemic phase” (13). Despite the
propensity of influenza epidemics to be amplified in pri-
mary schools (14), data on the effectiveness of school clo-
sures are limited. Apparently no data or analyses exist for
recommending illness thresholds or rates of change that
should lead to considering closing or reopening schools. 
During a 2-week teachers’ strike during an influenza
epidemic in Israel in 2000, significant decreases were seen
in the rates of diagnoses of respiratory infections, medica-
tion purchases, and other parameters for children 6–12
years of age; when school reopened, rates for these param-
eters rose again. The study did not report on illness in fam-
ily members (15). In 21 regions of France from 1984 to
2000, a temporal relationship was reported between school
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noses by general practitioners 10–20 days later and the
daily death rate 30–40 days later, although the time delay
raises the question of whether outbreaks may have been
subsiding on their own (16).
On a small island in the United States in 1920, the sin-
gle public school was a focal point for the spread of
influenza, and a report from that period concluded that
“prompt closure of the school would probably not have
prevented the epidemic, but might have delayed it” (17).
School closure might be less effective in some urban areas
than in rural areas because urban children can more easily
meet elsewhere: in 1918, more influenza cases developed
among pupils in a Chicago school after a holiday than
when schools were in session (9). In Connecticut, the 3
largest cities (Bridgeport, Hartford, and New Haven) kept
schools open under “close medical supervision,” and their
death rates were reportedly lower than those in some
Connecticut cities (New London and Waterbury) that
closed their schools (8). 
Universal influenza vaccination of children is contro-
versial, but its use has provided data that help assess the
potential effect of reducing transmission by schoolchild-
ren. For example, in 1968–1969, when 86% of its school-
children were vaccinated against influenza, the small town
of Tecumseh, Michigan, had one third the illness rate of
nearby towns where children were not vaccinated (18). In
Japan, when most schoolchildren were vaccinated against
influenza (1962–1987), excess death in the entire popula-
tion decreased 3- to 4-fold and rose again when the pro-
gram was discontinued (19).
Simultaneous Use of Multiple Measures
Influenza and other respiratory viral infections appar-
ently declined in Hong Kong during the 2003 SARS epi-
demic, as determined on the basis of a review of viral
diagnostic laboratory records (20). Public health interven-
tions included closing schools, swimming pools, and other
public gathering places; cancelling sports events; and dis-
infecting taxis, buses, and public places. Ahigh percentage
of people wore masks in public and washed hands fre-
quently, and in general, much less social mixing occurred.
Reports from the 1918 influenza pandemic indicate that
social-distancing measures did not stop or appear to dra-
matically reduce transmission, but research studies that
might assess partial effectiveness are apparently unavail-
able. For example, in Lomé, British-occupied Togo, case-
patients, suspected case-patients, and contacts were
isolated; traffic was halted; schools and churches were
closed; public meetings were banned. Despite these and
other measures, influenza was well established in Lomé by
October (10). In Edmonton, Canada, isolation and quaran-
tine were instituted; public meetings were banned; schools,
churches, colleges, theaters, and other public gathering
places were closed; and business hours were restricted
without obvious impact on the epidemic (21,22). In the
United States, a comprehensive report on the 1918 pan-
demic concluded that closing schools, churches, and the-
aters was not demonstrably effective in urban areas but
might be effective in smaller towns and rural districts,
where group contacts are less numerous (8). 
Measures for Persons Entering or 
Exiting an Infected Area
In Australia in 1919, political tensions arose among
state governments and between states and the national gov-
ernment as individual states sought to protect themselves.
Issues included delayed disease reporting by the initially
affected state, controls at interstate borders, resistance to
quarantine measures, impoundment of the transcontinental
train in the state of Western Australia, and conflict between
national and state authorities in the Australian federal sys-
tem (23).
Specific details were recorded by the State of New
South Wales (NSW) (24): “After the first case was diag-
nosed in Sydney (capital of NSW State) …and determined
to have come from (the) adjacent (state of) Victoria, meas-
ures were taken by New South Wales at the interstate bor-
der to prevent importation of additional cases. These
included at first, prohibition of all inbound land traffic,
later replaced by quarantine detention camps at which
inbound travelers were required to remain at first 7, later 4
days. Also ships from Victoria State were required to
anchor in Sydney harbor for 4 days, after which disem-
barking persons were medically inspected. After Sydney
had nevertheless become severely affected, (unspecified)
restrictions on traveling out of Sydney were also
imposed.” The report states that any benefits of land quar-
antine or interstate or intrastate travel restrictions were
“very meager.”
In Canada in 1918, one report noted, “Many small
towns attempted to isolate themselves with complete quar-
antines, reminiscent of medieval attempts to stave off
plague, in which no one was allowed to enter or leave
town. No one was allowed to buy railway tickets to these
towns and passengers were barred from disembarking at
them. The Canadian Pacific Railway reported 40–45 towns
closed in the province of Manitoba during the height of the
epidemic; the Canadian Northern line bypassed 15 more.
The Alberta Provincial Police guarded roadblocks on
major highways in the Province of Alberta in an effort to
keep influenza from reaching three prairie municipalities.
These measures were nonetheless ‘lamentably inefficient
in checking the spread of the disease.’Quite simply, isolat-
ing individuals and families or quarantining entire commu-
nities did not work” (6,21,22).
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Alaska implemented measures, such as a 5-day quarantine
on entering travelers, to exclude infected people. Some
towns apparently succeeded in escaping the disease, but
others did not (8,25). In July 1921, an explosive outbreak
of influenza occurred on the Pacific island of New
Caledonia, a French territory. Authorities implicated a ship
that had recently arrived at the capital city of Nouméa from
Australia, where normal seasonal (winter) influenza cases
were occurring. Illness spread rapidly in Nouméa and the
southern portion of the colony, in part because of numer-
ous gatherings in celebration of Bastille Day on July 14.
However, authorities successfully prevented spread to the
isolated northern third of the island. Travel by land to the
north was prohibited, a measure that was facilitated by the
lack of major roads to the area. Ships leaving Nouméa for
the north were required to remain in quarantine for at least
48 hours before departure, and during that time, tempera-
tures of passengers and crew were monitored (26). 
Recent modeling studies have supported the use of
quarantine measures in the unique circumstances of con-
taining an emerging influenza subtype originating in rural
Thailand as a supplement to geographically targeting
antiviral drugs to the surrounding population. In 1 model,
administering antiviral drugs to 90% of people in a 5-km
radius within 2 days after detecting illness in 20 persons
was estimated to contain a novel subtype with a basic
reproduction number (R0) of 1.5 (R0 is the mean number of
secondary cases generated by 1 infected person in a fully
susceptible population). If prophylaxis were supplemented
by closing 90% of schools and 50% of workplaces and
reducing movement in and out of the affected area by 80%,
the model predicted a 90% probability of containment if R0
= 1.9 (27). These additional measures would help over-
come shortcomings in case identification and treatment
rates; the epidemic could be contained after <200 cases
had been detected. Unsuccessful containment nevertheless
delayed widescale spread by >1 month in the model. Asec-
ond modeling study predicted that if every case-patient
stayed at home and 70% of susceptible persons remained
in their neighborhoods (but no antivirals were given), dis-
ease containment would be 98% if R0 = 1.4 and 57% if R0
= 1.7 (28). These estimates were based on the population
structure and interaction dynamics in Thailand and apply
to early detection of cases emerging in a rural area.
Personal Protection and Hygiene Measures
Wearing Masks in Public
Apparently no controlled studies assess the efficacy of
mask use in preventing transmission of influenza viruses.
During the 1918 influenza pandemic, mask use was com-
mon and even required by law in many jurisdictions.
Skepticism arose, however; the medical officer of health
for Alberta, Canada, noted that cases of disease continued
to increase after mask use was mandated, and public con-
fidence in the measure’s efficacy gave way to ridicule (6).
In Australia, mask-wearing by healthcare workers was
thought to be protective, and given evidence of transmis-
sion in a closed railway carriage, it was concluded that
mask wearing “in closed tramcars, railway carriages, lifts,
shops, and other in enclosed places frequented by the pub-
lic had much to recommend it.” However, mask-wearing
in the open air, as initially required in Sydney, was later
thought to be unnecessary (24).
In the United States, persons also wore masks as a pro-
tective measure. Areport from Tucson, Arizona, noted that
early measures included “…isolation of ill people, closure
of schools, churches, theatres, etc. The epidemic worsened
however. As weeks passed, criticism of the measures was
expressed, most vocally by businesses losing money but
also by religious and educational institutions. To allow
some businesses to reopen, city officials ordered ‘masks to
be worn in any place where people meet for the transaction
of necessary business’… (and later by) all persons appear-
ing in public places. Within a few days, there was virtual-
ly universal compliance with mask wearing, but the
epidemic was subsiding” (29).
During the SARS epidemic in 2003, 76% of Hong
Kong residents reported wearing masks in public. As noted
above, influenza virus isolation rates decreased, but since
multiple measures were implemented, the contribution of
mask use, if any, is uncertain (20). In case-control studies
conducted in Beijing and Hong Kong, wearing masks in
public was independently associated with protection from
SARS in a multivariate analysis. One study found a dose-
response effect (30). Methodologic limitations of the stud-
ies (e.g., retrospective questionnaire design) limit drawing
conclusions (30,31). 
Hygiene and Disinfection
Recommendations for “respiratory hygiene/cough
etiquette,” such as covering one’s mouth when coughing
and avoiding spitting, have been made more on the basis of
plausible effectiveness than controlled studies (32). As
summarized in part 1 of this article, influenza virus can
remain viable on environmental surfaces and is believed
transmissible by hands or fomites (3). Most, but not all,
controlled studies show a protective effect of handwashing
in reducing upper respiratory infections  (Appendix 2,
available online at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12
no01/05-1371_app2.htm). Most of the infections studied
were likely viral, but only a small percentage were due to
influenza (33). No studies appear to address influenza
specifically. In addition, only 1 study (in Pakistan) has
been conducted on the effect of handwashing on severe
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al settings and involve children; the few   involving adults
were of college students and military recruits. Anti-
bacterial handwashing products do not offer an advantage
over soap and water. In the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong
in 2003, a case-control study found that washing hands
>10 times per day and “disinfecting living quarters thor-
oughly” (not otherwise defined and reported retrospective-
ly by telephone) appeared to be protective in a multivariate
analysis (31). 
Discussion
The knowledge base for use in developing guidance for
nonpharmaceutical interventions for influenza is limited
and consists primarily of historical and contemporary
observations, supplemented by mathematical models,
rather than controlled studies evaluating interventions.
Accordingly, WHO guidance is subject to revision based
on additional information. Aside from transmission char-
acteristics of the pandemic strain, which can be estimated
but not completely known before a pandemic is under way,
guidance for interventions at the national and community
level depends on the phase of the pandemic, the severity of
disease (a more virulent strain will justify more socially
demanding measures), and the extent of transmission in
the particular country and community. Animal sources of
virus that has been linked to human infection should be
controlled and human exposure to infected animals mini-
mized (35). In phases 4 and 5 of the pandemic-alert peri-
od, which is characterized by limited and highly localized
human-to-human transmission, aggressive measures to
detect and isolate case-patients and to quarantine their con-
tacts are recommended and should be accompanied by
restrictions on movement in and out of affected communi-
ties and consideration of geographically targeted antiviral
therapy. These measures, however, are considered much
less likely to be feasible in an urban population (1,3,27). 
The prediction from mathematical models that an
emerging novel human influenza virus subtype might be
containable at a point of origin in rural Southeast Asia in
phases 4 and 5 through the targeted use of antivirals and
application of public health measures was not intended to
apply once a pandemic has begun or to address other situ-
ations (for example, when a pandemic strain enters into a
new country at multiple loci) (27,28). After increasing and
sustained transmission occurs in the general population of
even 1 country (phase 6, pandemic period), eventual
worldwide spread is considered virtually inevitable, and
the public health response focus would shift to reducing
impact and delaying spread to allow time for vaccine
development and institution of other response measures.
Part 1 of this article dealt with measures at the internation-
al level, but community-level measures outlined in this
part of the article will likely have a greater effect, as was
true for SARS in 2003. Over time, the changing conditions
during a pandemic will require a change in the public
health response and recommended interventions, and the
need for such changes will present a difficult but critical
communications challenge.
Field studies coordinated by WHO will be needed to
assess virus transmission characteristics, amplifying
groups (e.g., children vs. adults), and attack and death
rates. Information on these factors will be needed urgently
at the onset of a pandemic because the pandemic subtype
may behave differently than previous pandemic or season-
al strains. Such studies will also be needed throughout the
pandemic period to determine if these factors are changing
and, if so, to make informed decisions regarding public
health response measures, especially those that are more
costly or disruptive.
Evidence and experience suggest that in pandemic
phase 6 (increased and sustained transmission in the gen-
eral population), aggressive interventions to isolate
patients and quarantine contacts, even if they are the first
patients detected in a community, would probably be inef-
fective, not a good use of limited health resources, and
socially disruptive. During phase 6, ill persons should be
advised to remain at home, if possible, as soon as symp-
toms develop (and their caregivers should be advised to
take appropriate precautions [5]), but doing so would like-
ly require financial and other support for those off work
with illness. Measures to increase social distance should
be considered in affected communities, depending on the
epidemiology of transmission, severity of disease (case-
fatality ratio), and risk groups affected. Nonessential
domestic travel to affected areas should be deferred if
large areas of a country remain unaffected, but enforcing
domestic travel restrictions is considered impractical in
most cases. 
Handwashing and respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette
(32) should be routine for all and strongly encouraged in
public health messages; such practices should be facilitat-
ed by making hand-hygiene facilities available in schools,
workplaces, and other settings where amplification of
transmission would be expected. WHO has recommended
that mask use by the public should be based on risk, includ-
ing frequency of exposure and closeness of contact with
potentially infectious persons; routine mask use in public
places should be permitted but not required. This recom-
mendation might be interpreted, for example, as supporting
mask use in crowded settings such as public transport. The
use of masks or respirators, as well as other precautions, for
occupationally exposed workers also depends on risk and
is beyond the scope of this review (4,5). Disinfection of
household surfaces likely to be contaminated by infectious
secretions appears worthwhile, but no evidence supports
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or air. The legal authority and procedures for implement-
ing interventions should be understood by key personnel
before a pandemic begins, and all such measures should
respect cultural differences and human rights (1,36).
The need is urgent for additional research on transmis-
sion characteristics of influenza viruses and the effective-
ness of nonpharmaceutical public health interventions.
Such research should include epidemiologic and virologic
studies and field assessments of effectiveness and cost,
supplemented by modeling studies and historical inquiry.
Such research could be undertaken during epidemics of
seasonal influenza, and some research investment now
being devoted to influenza should be dedicated to this end.
Research needs include evaluating the effectiveness of
mask use and cough etiquette and evaluating interventions
in terms of cases detected and prevented, cost, and effec-
tiveness in alleviating public concerns. Research is also
needed to identify ways to make quarantine and other
restrictions more focused and less burdensome for individ-
ual persons and societies and to assess how “leaky” restric-
tions can be and still be effective. Improved methods are
also needed to communicate with essential partners and the
public. Finally, improved informatics capabilities would
allow outbreaks to be monitored and interventions to be
assessed in real time to meet the needs of all who will help
control future pandemics.
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